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Abstract 
A modelling language is decribed which is 
suitable for the correlation of information when 
the underlying functional model of the system is 
incomplete or uncertain and the temporal 
dependencies are imprecise. An efficient an 
incremental implementation is outlined which 
depends on cost functions satisfying certain 
criteria. Possibilistic logic and probability theory 
(as it is used in the applications targetted) satisfy 
these criteria. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
A modelling language is decribed which is suitable for the 
correlation of information when the ooderlying functional 
model of the system is incomplete or uncertain and the 
temporal dependencies are imprecise. This language has its 
roots in the diagnosis and maintenance of 
telecommunications systems and is designed to be 
modular and to allow the modelling of large systems. The 
need to integrate uncertainty management and temporal 
constraint management is illustrated in the context of 
diagnosis in a satellite subsystem. An efficient 
implementation approach is outlined using cost functions 
which satisfy certain criteria to control computation. 
Possibilistic logic and probability theory (as it is used 
here) do. 
Models are initially constructed in a logical form in terms 
of covering rules. Logical relationships can be used to 
represent several different oocertainty calculi, including 
probability, belief functions and possibilistic logic, and to 
model the temporal constraints. The result of a diagnosis 
is the genemtion of explanations that explain all the 
symptoms, at least to some degree of belief. An 
explanation is a conjunction of necessary contributory 
causes each with a temporal imprecision constraint and a 
degree of belief. Multiple causes are allowed. 
1.1 MOTIVATION 
In many on-line diagnostic systems fault reports are 
collected and clustered according to the time in which they 
occur. An assumption of such systems is that there are no 
significantly differing propagation delays along different 
causal paths. However in some applications there may be 
imprecise or indeterminate time delays along different 
causal paths. In such cases the clustering and correlation 
processes have to be integrated. 
Example: Different time delays in a tl�ennal and electrical 
causal path 
Consider an example as shown in figure 1 that sketches a 
fault impact model some of the equipment connected to 
the power bus of a satellite. The uppermost shaded nodes 
represent the possible causes. Causal relationships 
between events are qualified with oocertainty degrees 
(here possibility n and necessity N) and temporal delays 
are represented as time intervals [d-min, d-max], 
representing minimum and maximum delays between 
consecutive events. The oocertainty in the delay rules are 
interpreted as the belief in the transition. The interval 
effectively gives the time period during which the 
tmnsition must happen if it is going to happen. For 
example after a tempemture increase in the KU area begins 
(at time t say) it can take between 5 and 60 minutes to 
cause watchdog software triggering. The necessity of the 
triggering is ;;:: 0.9, but if it is to trigger it must happen 
between [t+S, t+60]. 
A Voltage Regulator connects enough Solar Arrays 
Sections to the power bus to meet the power 
consumption, and batteries are used to provide shortfall in 
the solar energy. The causal model expresses the 
knowledge about uncertain links between faults <n:l 
observable events - here using possibilistic logic, and the 
imprecise temporal delays between the events. The model 
describes the dynamic behaviour of the power subsystem 
of the satellite. For example the failure of the protection 
transistor may have both an electrical and thermal impact 
on the satellite, with different dynamics. Electrical 
propagation is faster than thermal propagation. More 
precisely, if the Over-Voltage transistor fails then the 
symptom "payload shedding" can arise via two different 
causal paths. In the illustration the joint possibility 
distributions are essentially 'noisy or' logic, though any 
distribution can be modelled. Exploiting uncertainty in the 
causal links allows a fmer description of the phenomena 
and the ranking of the fault hypotheses. 
Shedding occurs when triggered. Only the fsrst signal to 
shed payload can be observed. So the signal to shed as a 
result of thermal effects can be masked by the previous 
electrical signal. However the electrical path is not certain 
so sometimes the fsrst signal is caused by the thermal 
effects. If we do not account for the time delays, then 
observing payload shedding may lead us to give too much 
belief to Over-Voltage Transistor failure, rather than the 
other possible causes -- an exceptional payload power 
request or a problem in the KU area. Using the 
necessities (or probabilities in another modeling) ignoring 
the temporal constraints is basing the diagnosis on the 
assumption that every possible symptom that could be 
observed had enough time to be observed. 
Identifying possible causes possible causes early, allows 
us to predict possible future events and look for them, :n1 
take corrective action. The temporal information gives 
extra discrimination power. 
As mentioned above the above fault impact model has two 
ways that payload shedding can occur. Certainly to 
compute the belief in payload shedding this loop is 
important as the probability of the disjunction needs to be 
calculated. However when the objective is to compute 
possible explanations for payload shedding then since the 
different possible paths to payload shedding correspond to 
different causal paths, it is appropriate for an explanation 
to be a conjunction of necessary conditions along a single 
causal path.Tbe efficiency of the algorithm described to 
compute explanations depends on this assumption in the 
case of probability theory, though for possibilistic logic it 
does not matter. 
extra 
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Figure 1: A simplified fault impact model including 
uncertain and temporal information 
2 THE MODELING LANGUAGE 
A language suitable for representing behaviour relevant to 
diagnostic reasoning when that reasoning uses logical 
relationships, uncertain dependencies, and temporal delays, 
is described. 
A functional entity consists of input ports , output ports 
and internal attributes called states. State variables :n1 
ports have a user defmed set of mutually exclusive values 
such as {working, not-working} or {high, medium, low}. 
The ports are connected to the ports of other functional 
entities, e.g. the power-out port of a modelled converter is 
connected with the power-in port of a modelled 
multiplexor-group. The functional entities together with 
these port-to-port connections are the functional model. 
The functional entities are called units in the modelling 
language. The state variable usually represents some 
unobservable factor which determines the behaviour. 
Sometimes a form of state variable is used to represent an 
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environmental condition, such as a particular 
configuration or setting of the system. These are then 
called environmental variables in the implementation. 
Ports are labelled locally within a functional entity and so 
the full identification of a port is something like F.O, 
where F is the name of the functional entity and 0 is the 
name of a port of the functional entity F. There may be 
other ports called 0 in different functional entities. State 
variables have a similar naming scheme. 
W hen building functional models from units an output 
port may be linked to any number of downstream input 
ports, but any input port may only be connected to one 
upstream output port This is to ensure that all behaviour 
is expressed in the units themselves and not in the 
connections between the ports. The connections between 
ports simply indicates a correspondence, and it is this 
separation which allows behaviour to be described locally. 
Units can be held in libraries which can be re-used at 
different places in the model, e.g. an optical link unit may 
be used whenever that kind of optical link is required. An 
output port and its associated input port(s) must all have 
the same domain. The representation has been used to 
support fault diagnosis in telecommWtications systems 
(Bigham). 
Extending the notation of Konolige to temporal axl 
uncertain models, the functionality of a diagnostic tool 
adopting a causal model of the unit port type can be 
represented as a causal theory <C, P, E, I. > where C 
corresponds to propositions concerning state variable 
values and so represents the possible causes; P 
corresponds to the set of possible port variable values; E 
corresponds to possible effects (i.e. observable values -
here observable port values as E � P.); and I. to the 
behavioural model relating the causes to the effects (i.e. 
how state variable values and input port values determine 
output port values). Causes appear in explanations of 
symptom sets. Explanations are described later. 
A typical elements of C is: 
power_supply _1. working_status = not_ working 
i.e. the "working_status" state variable of functional 
entity power_supply_ l (or synonymously unit 
power_supply_l ) has value not_working. 
Following others (e.g. Dousson 92) we will use a 
propositional reified logic to help express our models. Let 
D=: C u P be the set of propositions which are temporally 
qualified. D for example includes literals of the form 
F.O=abnormal, i.e. output port 0 of unit F has value 
·"abnormal", and F.self=not_working for the self state 
variable of unit F. Elements of D can be qualified by the 
predicates TRUE, FALSE, ON, and OFF. 
For any proposition X of D and for any time t, either 
TRUE(X, t) or FALSE(X, t) holds. Additionally 
TRUE(X, t, t') means that X is TRUE from t till t', i.e. 
TRUE(X , t, t') = V t e (t, t'] , TRUE( X, t). We 
will sometimes need different time points to be included 
and excluded and so defme: 
TRUE(X, t, t')::TRUE]](X, t, t') :: 'Vt e (t,t'], 
TRUE(X,r) 
TRUE[](X, t, t') = "it e [t,t'] , TRUE(X, t) etc. 
In the process of generating explanations each element of 
C may be augmented with a temporal constraint. An 
example of such a statement is: 
TRUEJ](F. self= working, -oo, 20) 
meaning that F is working during the interval ( -oo, 20]. 
We need to represent the event of a state variable going to 
a not-working or to a specific fault mode state. Once a 
state variable bas changed to not-working, or to a more 
specific fault mode, it is assumed to remain there. In what 
follows state variables are usually thought of as having 
domain { working, not_ working}. 
Events occur at an instant of time, and are expressed by 
the predicate ON. ON (X, t) = 
3t,t': (t < t < t') A FALSE(X,t,t) 
ATRUE(X,t,t') 
An element of D can now appear in expressions 
expressing transitions. For an element 
F.self=not_ working e C this could be of the form 
3t e [tpt2]: ON(F.self= not_ working, t) 
2.1 SOME ASSUMPTIONS 
Behaviour may result in temporal delays and this 
complicates the issues as there is uncertainty associated 
with the times till an effect occurs as well as the 
uncertainty associated with whether the event occurs at all. 
To allow a simple understanding of the uncertainty aspects 
the two aspects of uncertainty are decoupled as far as 
possible. The uncertainty associated with the antecedent 
determines if the rule is applicable but does not express 
any beliefs about when the effects will occur. The latter is 
expressed through the delays associated with the rules. In 
general the antecedent needs to contain predicates about 
temporal relationships but this will be minimised. 
The approach will be described in the context of binary 
domains where components can be either working or not­
working and pons can be either normal or abnormal. So 
whilst there may be a rich underlying functional model 
involving, say differential equations and control actions, 
we have mapped this model into a simpler functional 
model where the inputs and outputs refer to normal ad 
abnormal. The system is assumed initially to be in a fully 
working state with all inputs and outputs normal. This 
does not mean that the system is static. Symptoms are 
also preclassified in terms of normal or abnormal. The 
richer model is some form of simulation and is used to 
map inputs and outputs in the simpler model to normal oc 
abnormal by reasoning forwards from the inputs (if there 
are any) and hypothesized correct working behaviour in the 
richer model. This m apping of a richer functional model 
into a simpler one is not necessarily easy but common as 
it generally not possible to perform calculations regarding 
beliefs, particularly abduction, on the richer models. 
We assume that a cause (or more precisely a state variable) 
may change only once - from working to not-working oc 
to some specific fault mode. Different causal paths may 
lead to an output port which may be abnormal or normal. 
The effect of multiple reinforcements of "abnormal", say, 
through the different paths at possibly different times can 
have an effect on any rules which have this port in its 
antecedent 
When events are considered the process can become very 
complex even on such simple models. To simplify 
matters further some assumptions about the world will be 
made. The only abnormal symptoms at a port we will 
analyse is the ftrst transition to abnormal. We will not be 
analysing signals of symptoms which go from normal to 
abnormal back to normal etc. This is quite reasonable 
given the abstraction level we are working at. Furthermore 
if the input is abnormal we have no way of saying what is 
normal output. We will look at the modeling of an 
uncertain link and a "noisy or'' model depending on this 
assumption. Despite the simplicity of the model it is 
relevant to many applications. 
A state variable X, say, will have domain: 
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(3t: ON(X= not_working, t), TRUE][(X=working, -oo, 
+oo)} 
or if X is a port then the domain will be 
( 3t: ON(X= abnormal, t), TRUE][(X=normal, -oo, +oo)} 
The time of the last symptom of interest can be 
substituted for +oo if wanted. 
We will usually write { x, -x } for brevity, or {working, 
not_working}, or {normal, abnonnal} but they have the 
interpretation above. Notice that the domain does not 
contain any information about when X becomes 
not_ working or abnormal. Similarly the rules which give 
the semantics of the uncertainty rules do not involve 
quantiftcation of time delays. This does not however mean 
that we do not use given information on time delays, just 
that the uncertainty semantics does not depend on 
knowing about the times. 
In oo:ler to keep the modeling simple, temporal 
relationships are not used to specify the degree of 
coincidence of events, rather lower and upper bounds are 
placed on the delay. The approach could be extended 
naturally to include statements about temporal 
coincidence. A consequence of the restriction is that whilst 
temporal synergy is not ignored (positive synergy may for 
example allow a reduced upper bound to delays) it is not 
exploited as fully as it could. Importantly however it is 
not missed in explanations even though a more refined 
approach, naturally, would have more discrimination. 
2.2 A SINGLE LINK 
Take the case where an input port X affects an output port 
Z. Here we are looking at the case often modeled by a 
single link in an Bayesian network by four conditional 
probabilities. 
Figure 2: A link 
In engineering systems the link is a functional entity <ni 
as such has behaviour. It is incompletely modeled. P[Z 
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=abnonnall X"'abnonnal] is affected by the 'kind' of 
abnormality at X and the nature of propagation through 
the link, whilst P[Z:abnonnall X=nonnal] essentially 
only refers to a "spontaneous" fault, -y say, occurring in 
the link. If explanations involving the link functional 
entity are sought and if there are delays associated with 
this "fault" it can pay to model the link with an explicit 
"fault" state variable. (It is not being said that this cannot 
be modeled using a Bayesian link by adding an explicit 
cause. Rather it is arguing that the explicit cause often 
needs to be OOdfrl and discussing the distribution with 
which to combine the effects from upstream and the 
explicit cause - when there are, and when there are not, 
temporal dependencies.) 
A simple model which expresses the only ways that Z 
may become abnormal in terms of input port X and the 
state variable Y with domain { y, -y} is 
-x " y " a v -y � -z (A) 
where -x = 3t: ON (X= abnormal, t), -y = 3t: ON(Y= 
not_ working, t) and y = TRUE][(Y=working , -oo, +oo), 
The model only involves one uncertain context 
assumption a (a 'causation event') which can be rem as 
'an abnormality at X is of the kind to produce an 
abnormality at Z when Y is normal' and is a reflection of 
the granularity of the model. Y is used to model effects on 
Z which are not caused by X. If Y were not present then 
P(Z;;;;;:nonnaliX"'nonnal]=l. -y may hold for different 
values of the input variable X; -y covers the cases -x " 
-y and x" -y. In fact the delay associated with -y re.ed 
not depend on the cases is may be taken as exactly 0 as Y 
is simply used to represent the functioning of the unit m 
Y has no parents . The delay associated with -x " y " a 
is specified by the user. 
More generally we may have explicit delays associated 
with the terms in a rule (such as -x " y " a and -y) 
which can be used to compute intervals in which the 
events must have occurred. For example the following 
rule may actually be used 
3t* E [t + t1 ,t + t2]:0N(X= abnormal, t)" 
TRUE][(Y=working , -oo, +oo) 1\ a v 
3t* E [t + t3,t + t4] :ON(Y= not-working, t)-+ ON 
(Z=abnormal, t*) 
though the uncertainty semantics comes from the simpler 
rule. In such a case the delay associated with -y needs to 
be conservative to cover the cases included. 
When reasoning from observations in order to hypothesise 
causes we will want to determine the causes of -z at time 
t. Using the relationship -x A y A a v -y � -z allows 
us to associate an interval with -x (and a) of [t - upper 
bound to delay of -x A y " a, t-lower bound to delay of 
-x A y A a] which is interpreted as "at some time 
within", i.e. 3t such that at some time in the interval the 
literal holds; and an interval [0, t) is associated with y and 
is read as "holds during" " i.e. 'v't in the interval the literal 
holds; and an interval [t-upper bound to delay of -y, t] 
with -y ] which is interpreted as "at some time within". 
The relationship complementary to (A) is: 
-a " -x " y v y " x � z (B) 
This states the conditions under which Z remains normal. 
(Not how Z becomes normal.) The relationship (B) is 
necessary for reasoning backwards from z. -a " -x could 
be read "there is a case (or indeed some cases) when the 
input is abnormal, but for all of these cases they were of 
the wrong kind" to cause abnormality. 
In such a complementary rule the concept of a delay has 
no meaning. Only rules which predict abnormal port 
values have user specified delays. However when 
reasoning from an observation z (i.e. z is normal and has 
always been normal) we can still associate intervals with 
the literals. If the literal is positive then this corresponds 
to a state variable or port value always being normal axl 
so are given temporal intervals [0, t ) (or ( ..oo, t ) if we 
imagine the system starting not at time 0, but at some 
period in the past before any symptoms occur). These 
intervals are now rem as "during" i.e. 'v't in the interval 
the literal holds. If the literal is negative then the same 
interval is given (namely [0, t )  ) but the interpretation is 
"at some time", i.e. 3t such that at some time in the 
interval the literal holds. The different interpretations of 
the intervals are used when intersections and unions of the 
intervals are taken. 
We wanted a simple model of a link as we want to reason 
backwards without generating unnecessary possibilities in 
order to compute possible temporal intervals to associate 
with fault hypotheses. The model (A) and (B) is relevant 
in many cases. A rather informal justification is given 
below. The full conditional probability distribution would 
be: 
-x A y A a v (-x A -y) " � v x" y "y v x " -y 
A 0 � -z 
x A y A y is not worth having as we are happy to believe 
that in the case x A y then z must always hold. The most 
problematic tenn is -x A -y A �- Whilst tbe tenn -x A �y 
A p can lead to a multiple fault explanations for �z (am 
we are interested in multiple fault explanations) the 
difference between this multiple fault and others covered 
later is that Y is a state variable and so bas no upstream 
causes. Computationally it is easy to create the 
explanations for the joint occurrence of -y and the causes 
of -x simply by replacing y A a by -y in aU 
explanations generated which contain y (and a). The belief 
for an explanation containing causes of -x and -y must be 
less than the belief of the explanation containing causes 
for -x and y so long as P[y A a] > P[-y] This is very 
reasonable and so will apply in most models. So such 
explanations already generated should be kept until their 
belief, when -y replaces y A a. , is greater than any 
others. Hopefully we would have identified the causes 
before this stage. Similarly for the case (-x A -y) A -P 
causing z. The temporal intervals to associate with the 
causes in the explanations need to be revised but this is 
not discussed here. 
2.3 TWO INPUT PORTS AFFECTING AN 
OUTPUT PORT 
Here there are two inputs with domains {normal, 
abnormal}. We will assume that uncertainty arises 
through granularity rather than through failure of the 
functional unit. A functional model with multiple inputs 
and with state could be built from links as previously 
described and the unit to be described. 
Under the assumption of no state if both inputs are 
effectively normal then the output must be normal. The 
most simple model (under our assumptions) is: 
X A y V (-X A -a) A y V 
-a) A (-y A-�) HZ 
with complementary relationship 
-X A a V -y A � H -z 
When reasoning backwards from z the interval associated 
with -x or -y is [0, t) and interpreted as at some time 
within. The intervals created for y and x are interpreted as 
during. 
Now we have to make some assumptions about the nature 
of the propagation. We will assume that two events can 
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occur at Z (i.e. the effect is not masked) If the pon Z fans 
out to affect many downstream functional entities then the 
two causes of -z may cause symptoms at different times. 
However if Z is an observable then the second event is 
masked as far as observation is concerned but not as 
regards further propagation. So abduction from an 
observed symptom is fmding the explanations of the first 
'symptom'. Predictions of later abnormalities at the point 
where an abnormal symptom is observed are not 
necessarily inconsistent. 
If there are some time delays, and even in the case where 
all the delays are zero, it is possible that a more liberal 
notion of tbe "right kind of -x" and the "right kind of -y" 
is appropriate when -x and -y bold simultaneously as 
there may be some synergy which allows a broOOer 
(reduced is conceptually possible, but ignored here) 
context to trigger the effect. This is called context 
synergy. 
A richer model which allows for a broader context to be 
applicable when abnormality is present at both inputs is: 
(-x "a" y) v (-x A a)" (-y "-(�v a)) v 
-y A�) V (-X A- (aV \jl)) A (-y A �) V 
(cxv 'ljl)) " (-y A (�v a) H-z (1) 
or equivalently 
(X A 
(-x" 
The last term gives the case where the joint occwrence of 
-x and -y are necessary for �z. This reduces the to 
previous model if 'I' and a do not hold. We may associate 
with \jl and a a probability (say) of P[a] and P['ljl]. 
(1) has complement: 
X A y V (-X A -a.) A y 
-(a V \jl)) A (-y A-�) 
" -a) Hz 
V ( -y A -�) A X V (-X A 
v (-y "-( � v cr)) "(-x 
(2) 
These relationships say nothing about the times axl 
delays. It just specifies all the contexts that can cause -z. 
Here 'I' and cr, where \jl A a = .l and a " � = .l, are the 
additional contexts where -x can cause -z etc. (Other 
models are possible.) 
Even if both -x and -y occur they do not need to overlap 
in the times of their effects, though there must come a 
time when they are both true, because of our assumption 
that they cannot return to either x or y. However synergy 
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may also make effects quicker or slower. This is temporal 
synergy. The time to the effect is also influenced by the 
degree of temporal coincidence of input values. For 
example in (1) if -x occurs long before -y and the delay 
associated with-x is not long, then the delay will be that 
of -x even if there would be temporal synergy when both 
-x and-y hold. The delay associated with a term such as 
-x A (a v 'Jf) A -y A(� v <1) depends on bow close -x 
and -y happen. 
An advantage of the representation of (la) is that the time 
difference of -x and -y need not be expressed explicitly. 
From (1) it can be seen that minimum delay associated 
with each of the first two terms of (la), i.e. (-x A a) � 
( -y A �). must be equal to zero. The upper bounds to 
these two terms will come from the bounds associated 
with (-x A o.) A y and (-y A �) A x respectively. The 
last term of ( l a) only has a meaning when -x and -y 
temporally overlap and needs to be specified by the 
modeler. The effect can only start when both -x. and -y 
hold so it may be non zero. 
If there is temporal synergy we could, as well as dividing 
into terms based on context (as has been done), divide into 
terms based on the time between -x and -y. Then more 
precise intervals could possibly be attributed to the terms. 
However the boundaries between different cases are not 
easy to specify, and in the interests of parsimony we cb 
not use temporal conditions in the terms. This means that 
the intervals in the relationships must specify (in the 
positive synergy case) the lower bounds based on maximal 
temporal coincidence and upper bounds on minimal 
temporal coincidence. So unless temporal conditions are 
used as part of the terms any temporal synergy is partially 
masked by the different degrees of coincidence. The 
approach tries to keep the models the user has to specify 
simple. 
3 FINDING EXPLANATIONS FROM 
SYMPTOMS- IMPLEMENTATION 
The reasoning process produces abductive explanations 
for a set of observations 0� E. An abductive explanation 
for a single observation is simply a special case which is 
important in the implementation. An explanation is 
denoted by E and is a conjunction of literals from C, each 
augmented by a temporal constraint and uncertainty value, 
such that 
each E is consistent with :E . (:E includes all the 
relationships between input ports, state variables axl 
output ports and also the temporal constraints. ) 
:E u £ 1- 0 to some degree of belief > 0. 
An example of an explanation is: 
TRUE(unit5.working-status =working, -oo, 10) A 
3t e ( -oo, 20] :ON(unitl. working-status =not-working, 
t) probability 0.05 
The e generated are not mutually exclusive (c.f. 
Poole).This allows explanations to retain their 
interpretation simplicity. 
The condition :E u e 1- 0 to some degree of belief is 
satisfied by the construction process described since the 
model is assumed covering A cautious explanation set x, 
for 0 is a disjunction of all the abductive explanations for 
0 i.e. I; = v Ei where each Ei is an abductive explanation. 
An option available in small applications is to produce a 
cautious explanation set, though for non trivial problems 
only a subset can be practically generated. In the current 
implementation a cost bounded ATMS (CBA1MS) 
(Ngair and Provan, Bigham, De Kleer) is used as a 
focusing mechanism to select low cost explanations first. 
A polynomial time behaviour can be achieved using a cost 
function and assuming the A 1MS network contains no 
cycles and has O(q2) connections for q network nodes. 
From the definition of an explanation it can be seen that 
the multiple fault model is being considered. In the 
implementation the single fault model is included 
efficiently as a special case because of the incremental 
approach. 
If we have observations OJ, oz, .. on. and corresponding 
cautious explanation sets for each individual observation 
l;t,l;2. !;3 , ...... l;n. Since all observations are true and the 
rules are covering then 
1- 0} 1\ 02 A •....• A 0n '= !;1 A !;2 A ••••••• A l;n 
Temporal intersections are used to eliminate explanations 
which are impossible because of the timings of the 
symptoms. 
3.1 PROBABILITY 
An efficient algorithm based on an extension of Ngair all 
Pro van's cost bounded A 'IMS to incorporate elimination 
of inconsistent temporal intervals can be used to construct 
explanations. This can be used even in cases where there 
are complementary assumptions, such as a and -a, which 
is common in uncertainty calculations for useful cost 
functions based on the number of not-worldng 
assumptions and on possibilistic logic. (See Bigham 95) 
The basic consideration is that the cost function must be 
such that resolution of environments cannot create a lower 
cost environment. 
However probability theory (in a general context) does not 
satsify the conditions on a cost function to ensure that 
environments are computed in a manner which yields an 
incremental algorithm and efficient blocking all 
unblocking of propagation in the A'IMS. 
However if we include all causation events as part of C, 
the set of causes, then it is not difficult to show that 
monotonicity is assured in generation of the explanations 
in the CBA1MS. (We still cannot replace causation 
events with numbers as could be done in the possibilistic 
case as it is important not to multiply repeatedly when 
environments are combined. In the possibilsitic case this 
is not a problem as minimums and maximums are taken.) 
The only problem is whether including causation events 
yields an adequate explanation. In general it does not. It 
can be argued that in practice when the timing of events is 
considered, it often is adequate. If we consider the 
symptom of payload shedding given earlier, there are two 
ways that this can happen (via the electrical path and via 
the thermal path). An explanation in terms of just causes 
(e.g. Overvoltage Transistor Failure) is implicitly a 
disjunction consisting of the different ways payload 
shedding could happen given the same root causes(s). Each 
disjunct would contain the same causes but different 
causation events corresponding to different paths. However 
the different causal paths make payload shedding occur at 
different times and the symptom has been triggered by 
events along one of the paths. The events along the other 
path may not even have happened yet. An explanation 
should be in terms of causes and causation events from a 
single causal path. So combination is not necessary, all 
indeed not desirable. 
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4 CONCLUSION 
A knowledge representation language that can be used to 
represent diagnostic problems that involve uncertainty, 
and imprecise propagation delays has been presented. 
The implementation approach to uncertain reasoning uses 
an incremental cost bounded algorithm where appropriate 
cost functions can be used to limit the computation in the 
context of the application requirements. A correlation 
system has been implemented in C++. 
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